IN THE LAST PART of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith puts his theory in a class with those of his contemporaries Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, namely, the systems that make sentiments the principle of approbation. Despite recognizing important differences with both of them, he thinks that since he has placed the origin of moral sentiments in sympathy, and in particular the fact that we are able to enter into the motives of the agent and get pleasure from (...) finding them appropriate to their cause, sentiments are the foundation of his theory of morals. Many of Smith’s commentators, in fact almost all of the most important studies over the last few years, reaffirm the author’s self-description. However, my aim in this paper is to challenge this view by showing that Smith’s system can also be plausibly seen as a theory of practical reasoning, and in some important aspects very similar to Aristotelian ethics. Surprisingly few scholars have seen this parallel. Laurence Berns, Samuel Fleischacker, Charles Griswold, and Gloria Vivenza are the latest exceptions, identifying several points of coincidence between Adam Smith and Aristotle’s ethics. None of them, however, has tied all these similarities under a unified interpretation, such as the one I propose here: The basic analogy between these theories, and the source of those particular coincidences, is the operation of practical reason. Moreover, and besides the common elements with Aristotle’s ethics, Smith’s reconstruction of practical reason simultaneously announces some of the main features of modern accounts of ethics, such as impartiality and universality as preconditions of moral judgment. The integration of these ancient and modern elements in a single coherent theory allows Smith’s TMS to overcome the insufficiencies and paradoxes of both these traditions, and it constitutes one of the most interesting and challenging proposals of modern ethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith conflates two different meanings of ‘self-command’, which is particularly puzzling because of the central role of this virtue in his theory. The first is the matrix of rational action, the one described in Part III of the TMS and learned in ‘the great school of self-command’. The second is the particular moral virtue of self-command. Distinguishing between these two meanings allows us, on the one hand, to (...) solve some apparent paradoxes of the text; and, on the other, to identify various features of both the practical reason and deontological ethical traditions that are present in Smith's sentimentalism, enriching his phenomenological account of moral actions. (shrink)

Resumen Los filósofos sentimentalistas escoceses David Hume y Adam Smith proponen dos estrategias distintas para restringir las tendencias egoístas de la naturaleza humana. A pesar de las evidentes similitudes de sus propuestas morales, Smith encuentra dentro del ser humano la capacidad para transformar sus pasiones parciales y aspirar hacia ideales de perfección. El sentimentalismo de Hume, en cambio, no permite la autotransformación de la persona, y debe apoyarse en convenciones sociales para manipular y redirigir los impulsos egoístas desde fuera. Ambos (...) logran su objetivo. Pero mientras Hume se conforma con una moral funcional para la vida social, Smith abre una nueva dimensión de desarrollo para el ser humano.The Scottish sentimentalist philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith suggest different strategies for restricting and accommodating human selfish tendencies. In spite of the obvious similarities of their moral proposals, Smith finds within the human being the capacity to transform his partial passions and to aspire to ideals of perfection. In contrast, Hume's sentimentalism does not allow for self-transformation, and must rely on social conventions to manipulate and redirect selfish impulses from without. Both attempts achieve their goal. However, while for Hume peaceful social interaction seems to be the only aim of morality; for Smith morality also opens a new dimension of development for the human being. (shrink)

La ética que describe Adam Smith no es una ética relativista. Aunque muchas normas son convencionales, existen otras interculturales, en concreto las de justicia. ‘No dañar a un igual’ es una norma con dos elementos: el daño, que puede entenderse como relativo a la cultura; y los iguales, que aunque no sean siempre reconocidos, no dependen de las distintas culturas. En el daño a estos últimos se fundarían las normas interculturales de justicia.

en las últimas décadas la bioética se ha vuelto un tema crucial para la Iglesia. La dinámica propia de la técnica, que se auto-propulsa y avanza con independencia de criterios éticos, amenaza de modo inminente la dignidad humana. En la actualidad ya existe la posibilidad de producir artificialmente seres humanos, incluso sin la mediación de gametos. Pero lo que no existe son los índices para reconocer cuándo una célula intervenida sigue siendo sólo una célula -eventualmente pluripotencial y por tanto con (...) grandes promesas terapéuticas; o cuando ya es una célula totipotencial, un cigoto, un organismo humano: una persona. Ciencia, filosofía y teología, como se mostrará en este artículo, se unen en la reflexión bioética para encontrar de modo urgente esas señales; puesto que la biotecnología sigue avanzando, y hay de tomar posición sobre sus descubrimientos. La Iglesia no puede callar frente a una posible producción artificial, instrumentalización y destrucción de personas; que aunque estén en su fase unicelular y hayan llegado al mundo como artefactos, siguen siempre siendo el reflejo del Rostro de Dios. (shrink)

We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making (...) perceptual and moral judgments requires focusing on frequently co-occurring impressions (perceptions of objects or reactive sentiments) for tracking an existing object with its perceptual properties or an agent's character traits. Smith uses visual perception for the purpose of illustrating one source of the partiality of the sentiments people feel in response to actions. Before making a moral judgment, people have to disregard this partiality and accept that they are all equally important. Smith and Hume's different ways of relying on the same analogy reveals the still-overlooked and yet profound differences between their moral theories. (shrink)

Francis Hutcheson es un reconocido proto-utilitarista. Sin embargo, Adam Smith, su discípulo más prominente y sucesor en la cátedra de Filosofía Moral de la Universidad de Glasgow, tomó otros aspectos de la ética sentimentalista de su maestro y fundó, sobre la base del mismo sentimentalismo, una teoría moral completamente distinta. En este trabajo exploraré qué rasgos de la ética de Smith -en particular, los de la simpatía y espectador imparcial- se encuentran ya en germen en la ética de Hutcheson y (...) cómo Smith desarrolló esas intuiciones para, introduciendo una instancia de racionalidad en los juicios morales y sin traicionar la tradición sentimentalista, incluir también en su teoría moral elementos propios de la razón práctica.Francis Hutcheson is known as a proto-utilitarian. Adam Smith, though, his most prominent student an successor on the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, focuses on some different trends of his teacher's ethics and founds, based on the same sentimentalism, a completely different theory of morals. On this paper I explore what aspects of Hutcheson's ethics -particularly those of ‘sympathy' and the ‘impartial spectator'- where already present in his theory, and how Smith develops those intuitions in order to introduce a moment of rationality in moral judgments, whereby he is able to construct a theory that includes practical reasoning, without betraying the Scottish sentimentalist tradition. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo discuto acerca de la polémica entre Harry Frankfurt y Susan Wolf respecto a si es o no es importante que aquello que amamos sea objetivamente valioso, y si una vida completamente inmoral es tan valiosa como otra vida moral. Sostengo que aunque Frankfurt tiene razón al decir que el solo hecho de amar ya es valioso, eso no basta para una praxis plena. Dado que nuestros fines determinan nuestras elecciones, aquello que amemos determinará el tipo de (...) vida que tengamos y no cualquiera da igual. ABSTRACT In this paper I discuss the controversy between Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf as to whether or not it is important that what we care about is objectively valuable, and whether a completely immoral life is as valuable as a moral life. I argue that although Frankfurt is right in saying that the mere act of caring is already valuable, that is not enough for a meaningful praxis. Given that our ends in life determine our choices, whatever we love will determine the kind of life we have, and different kinds of life are not equally valuable. (shrink)

RESUMEN: En su Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales Adam Smith propone una ética que concilia dos paradigmas habitualmente considerados como incompatibles: una ética de virtudes, con normas orientativas e ideales de excelencia, y una ética con reglas universales que se aplican en todos los casos sin excepción. Smith lo hace cambiando el punto de vista desde el que se realiza el juicio moral, a una perspectiva que llamaré "simpatético-imparcial", y que corresponde a "los sentimientos simpatéticos de un espectador imparcial y (...) bien informado". Este novedoso punto de vista le permite introducir características modernas a la ética clásica de la virtud para dar una nueva justificación a las virtudes positivas, así como cambiar el modo de entender las "reglas o principios universales". De este modo, Smith construye una ética capaz de dar cuenta, dentro del mismo marco teórico, tanto de los ideales de excelencia propios de la virtud, como de los imperativos universales modernos. ABSTRACT: In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith reconciles two moral paradigms that are usually considered incompatible: an ethics of virtue, with general guidelines and ideals of excellence, and an ethics with universal rules, which must be applied to all cases without exceptions. Smith makes this possible by shifting the perspective from which moral judgments are assessed to what I call the 'sympathetic-impartial' perspective, which stands for "the sympathetic feelings of an impartial and well-informed spectator". From this new standpoint, Smith is able to introduce some modern features into classic virtue ethics and provide a different justification for positive virtues, as well as to change the way 'universal norms or principles' are understood. Accordingly, Smith's theory accounts simultaneously, and within the same theoretical framework, for both ancient-like virtues and their ideals of excellence and for modern-like universal imperatives. (shrink)

En este artículo postulo que, analizado a la luz de las enseñanzas del Magisterio de la Iglesia, tanto el llamado rescate como la adopción de embriones criopreservados abandonados debe considerarse una acción moralmente ilícita, al margen de la buena intención de las rescatistas y las trágicas circunstancias de los embriones. A diferencia de otros autores que se oponen por razones prudenciales o la relación de esta adopción con los bienes del matrimonio, yo propongo que el objeto de esta acción, la (...) transferencia heteróloga de un embrión criopreservado, es en sí una violación a la dignidad del embrión y en cuanto tal un mal intrínseco. Este es uno de los difíciles casos en que el respeto a la dignidad de la persona obliga a respetar su muerte antes que empeñarse por cualquier medio por salvar su vida. (shrink)

Gender Dysphoria in Children and Controversies about its Treatment: Two Different Conceptions of Gender Identity Disforia de gênero em crianças e controvérsias em seu tratamento: duas concepções diferentes sobre a identidade de gênero Gender dysphoria is a marked mismatch between the sex felt or expressed by an individual and that assigned to them at birth. It is associated with clinically significant discomfort or social impairment and can occur in children, adolescents, and adults. The literature mainly describes three approaches for preadolescents: (...) therapeutic model, watchful waiting, and gender affirmative model. However, there is currently no consensus on its treatment nor any evidence that favors one approach over another. This paper provides a brief review of the existing literature on gender dysphoria, explains various approaches for children, and discusses the anthropological views behind them. We argue that at least two ways of understanding gender identity have given rise to disagreements over the proposed treatments. It is quite important to comprehend the anthropological assumptions on which these models are based since they underlie different conceptions of the person’s sex-gender relationship and, therefore, the role of corporality and self-awareness in gender identity. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Cox P, Carrasco MA. Disforia de género en niños y controversias en su tratamiento: dos concepciones distintas sobre la identidad de género. Pers bioet. 2020;24:57-76. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2020.24.1.5 Recibido: 30/10/2019 Aceptado: 03/01/2020 Publicado: 07/05/2020. (shrink)